3 To which does a name refer?

Realists are convinced that reality really exists and that the words we use refer to things in that reality. In response to the ideas of a very old and a more recent philosopher, I argue that this view is untenable, leading to a curious paradox.

3.1 A quote of Russell

In this chapter I quote a text by Bertrand Russell about a reasoning by the Greek philosopher Parmenides. I numbered some sentences for the next discussion.
Russell writes in his 'History of Western Philosophy' ^[1] about the philosophy of Parmenides:

"The thing that can be thought and that for the sake of which the thought exists is the same; for
you cannot find thought without something that is, as to which it is uttered."

"The essence of this argument", according to Russell, is: "When you think, you think of something; when you use a name, it must be the name of something. Therefore both thought and language require objects outside themselves. And since you can think of a thing or speak of it at one time as well as at another, whatever can be thought of or spoken of must exist at all times. Consequently there can be no change, since change consists in things coming into being or ceasing to be. (...)

Suppose, for example, that you talk of George Washington. Unless
there were a historical person who had that name, the name (it would seem) would be
meaningless, and sentences containing the name would be nonsense. Parmenides maintains that
not only must George Washington have existed in the past, but in some sense he must still exist,
since we can still use his name significantly. This seems obviously untrue, but how are we to
get round the argument? (...)

What, then, are we to say about George Washington? It seems we have only two alternatives: one
is to say that he still exists; the other is to say that, when we use the words "George Washington,"
we are not really speaking of the man who bore that name. Either seems a paradox, but the latter is
less of a paradox, and I shall try to show a sense in which it is true.

(1) Parmenides assumes that words have a constant meaning; this is really the basis of his argument,
which he supposes unquestionable.
(2) But although the dictionary or the encyclopaedia gives what
may be called the official and socially sanctioned meaning of a word, no two people who use the same word have just the same thought in their minds.
(3) George Washington himself could use his name and the word "I" as synonyms. He could perceive
his own thoughts and the movements of his body, and could therefore use his name with a fuller
meaning than was possible for any one else.
(4) His friends, when in his presence, could perceive the movements of his body, and could divine his thoughts; to them, the name "George Washington" still denoted something concrete in their own experience.
(5) After his death they had to substitute memories for perceptions, which involved a change in the mental processes taking place when they used his name.
(6) For us, who never knew him, the mental processes are again different. We may think of his picture, and say to ourselves "yes, that man." We may think "the first President of
the United States." If we are very ignorant, he may be to us merely "The man who was called '
George Washington."
(7) Whatever the name suggests to us, it must be not the man himself, since we
never knew him, but something now present to sense or memory or thought.
(8) This shows the fallacy of the argument of Parmenides".

3.2 Why Russell's argumentation is wrong

I discuss Russell's argument point by point.

(1) Parmenides assumes that words have a constant meaning; this is really the basis of his argument, 
which he supposes unquestionable.

This starting point of Parmenides is not so crazy. We can still think and speak about George Washington, even though he has already long been dead. The question, however, about which we are actually speaking, is right. Russell's answer that we are now speaking about something else than contemporaries at the time, is less obvious than it seems. Of course, Washington no longer lives and is at most a historical figure to us. For his contemporaries, by contrast, Russell is stating, he was a truly existing person, the first president of the independent United States. Suppose Russell is right, poning that for us the name George Washington would have a different meaning than for his contemporaries. Then imagine the theoretical possibility we would communicate with such a contemporary. Russell's argument would mean that, talking about Washinton, we would communicate about two different concepts with the necessary consequence that we and the contemporary would not be able to understand each other.

We can not execute this thought experiment, but another form of communication is certainly possible. Nothing prevents us from reading stories about George Washington, written down by contemporaries, and preserved letters contemporaries have sent him or he himself has sent to contemporaries. In reality, that's what often happen with historical documents and we can not imagine that someone would be surprised after reading such an old letter: "Washington has been dead for a long time. Now I read here he has an aversion to the chaos of the French Revolution, but the revolution has already ended two hundred years ago! What nonsense!".

Although both George and the French revolution ceased to exist more than two centuries ago, we can perfectly understand written testimonials from contemporaries. Apparently our understanding of it and that of contemporaries are so similar that we can still understand them. That does not appeal to Russell's view that we and a contemporary speak of different things; Parmenides' thesis that the George Washington's name apparently contains something that has the same meaning both in his time and in ours, does not seem so wrong.

(2) But although the dictionary or the encyclopaedia gives what 
may be called the official and socially sanctioned meaning of a word, no two people who use the same word have just the same thought in their minds.

To the way of mentioning the 'official and socially sanctioned meaning of a word in dictionary and encyclopedia' I will come back in the next chapter. The observation that no two people, using the same word, have exactly the same idea, I agree. Apparently that is not necessary condition to be able to communicate with each other.

(3) George Washington himself could use his name and the word "I" as synonyms. He could perceive 
his own thoughts and the movements of his body, and could therefore use his name with a fuller 
meaning than was possible for any one else.

I will not contest George Washington could use his name and the word "I" entirely as synonymous, although the sentence "I always sign my letters with George Washington" is not exactly the same as "George Washington always signs his letters with I" . What the 'fullness of meaning' could signify I'ld like to leave in the middle.

(4) His friends, when in his presence, could perceive the movements of his body, and could divine his thoughts; to them, the name "George Washington" still denoted something concrete in their own experience.

This creates a problem. I limit myself to the aspect of observing his body. It would suit Russell well if Washington's friends could also experience his thoughts, but that does not work, so he makes of it: divine. However, guessing one's thoughts can not be called a concrete experience of a person in whose presence one is, and therefore seems irrelevant here.

His friends could see him himself, so his name indicated a concrete, personal experience, Russell argues. Is that right? At the moments they are with him they can indeed perceive him. Russell rightly states at those moments they can observe the movements of his body. Imagine, at one point, Washington sits, smoking a pipe, in an armchair in front of a friend . Can we say then for that friend the name "George Washington" only indicated the concrete experience of a smoking man sitting in an armchair? Do not other facts known to him form part of his experience? For example, George Washington was trained as a surveyor and later as general battles lost but eventually won against the English. A man who prefers to be at Mount Vernon, who was the first president of the United States, admired by the people, do not all these kinds of facts form part of the name 'George Washington'?

If projected on your own experiences, the inadequacy of Russell's claim will immediately be seen. When for example, I shake hands with the Dutch princess Beatrix, she is not only a sturdy lady with a blown-up hairdo and a wrongly chosen hat. Then I am really very aware I shake hands with the former Queen of the Netherlands, which for me has a meaning that goes far beyond the image and a handshake with a random lady. The inadequacy of Russell's claim also appears from the situation a friend is not in Washington's vicinity. Would the name have a different meaning for him if he sees him in the flesh? In that case, how many different meanings would the name 'Washington' have for him?

I only can conclude the name 'George Washington', also for a friend in his time, not only indicates a concrete sensory experience but a complex concept which is composed of memories of many different experiences he has encountered in his life. These include his own concrete experiences with the person George Washington as well as a lot of other experiences which together determine the content of the meaning the name 'George Washington' has for him.

(5) After his death they had to substitute memories for perceptions, which involved a change in the mental processes taking place when they used his name.

In view of the foregoing, I cannot agree with this. When Washington dies, his friends existing memories remain and are supplemented with new experiences: the message of his death, the sight of the dead body, the feelings of sadness, the burial, and so on. This obviously changes the meaning of his name, while the old experiences are also maintained. Someone can hardly be friends with a decomposing corpse, but the sentence: "The friends of George Washington still commemorate him every year on December 14th," says, five years after his death, nothing strange. However, this is a sentence from the natural language, the logician Russell would analyze this sentence differently. The natural, not logically analyzed sense clearly indicates at the moment of pronouncing or writing down, we do not distinguish between the object five years ago when he was still alive and the reference of our thinking after his passing away.

(6) For us, who never knew him, the mental processes are again different. We may think of his picture, and say to ourselves "yes, that man." We may think "the first President of the United States." If we are very ignorant, he may be to us merely "The man who was called "George Washington."

For us, two hundred years later, it is indeed slightly different. If the name "George Washington" has meaning for us at all, it cannot contain memories of concrete experiences we have had with the living person Washington. But, unlike Russell states, we cannot only envisage his image or know he was the first president of the United States. Reading his letters or descriptions of contemporaries who have known him personally, we gain knowledge and experiences that go far beyond gaining an image of him or the knowledge that he was the first president, and even come quite far in the direction of the experiences of contemporaries. Of course difference remains with the meaning his name had for his friends or for other contemporaries.

(7) Whatever the name suggests to us, it must be not the man himself, since we never knew him, but something now present to sense or memory or thought.

That is correct. However, as argued above, this doesn't essentially differ from the meaning the name had for contemporaries. It's interesting Russell till now based himself on experiences and memories and now suddenly introduces the 'man himself'. At the same time he switches to the vague 'something now present to sense or memory or thought'.
Indeed, someone, who has been dead for two hundred years cannot himself be present in us, just like any still living people cannot, by the way.

Without any argument Russell assumes that the person himself is part of the meaning his name has for anyone, following Frege's^[2] notion 'Bedeutung'. However, as argued above, the meaning the name 'George Washington' has for someone can only consist of memories of experiences that the person in question has gained during his life, now existing in his mind. When "the man himself" dies his name continues to hold meaning, not only in the sense of a dead body. "The man himself" can possibly be regarded as the cause of all the experiences someone has gained with him, but cannot be part of the meaning his name has for others.

(8) This shows the fallacy of the argument of Parmenides".

Parmenides' position is untenable in my opinion too. Although the concept 'George Washington' still exists even two hundred years after his death, it no longer has the same content as during his life. It is, opposed tot Parmenides claim, not constant in time, it does change indeed. Moreover the meaning of the concept, both now and during his life, is different for different people. In it I follow Russell.

3.3 An insoluble paradox

However, Russell's opinion that 'the man himself' can be part of the meaning which his name has for a certain person, I have to contest. A concept doesn't consist of direct, concrete experiences. On the contrary, it's a complex of memories of direct and indirect experiences wich have evolved over time and still continue to develop. If a concept is about someone's name, for people who know him personally the concepts consists not only of experiences with the person himself, always of many indirect experiences too, such as opinions, newspaper-debates, statements he makes, decisions taken by him, his home, his family, nowadays also film and television images, and so on.

With Frege, Russell, like all modern realists, saw the meaning of a name as a reference to the physical object to which that name relates. The argumentation of Parmenides forces him to leave that view and to give the concept of 'meaning' a different significance. He rightly states that a particular name can have a different meaning for everyone, both during and after the life of the person concerned. However, he does not realise or doesn't accept the obvious logical consequence that the meaning of a name cannot be the reference to that physical person. With this he creates an insoluble paradox.

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^[1] History of Western Philosophy and its connection with political and social circumstances from the earliest times to the present day.

^[2] Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (1848 - 1925) distinguished between 'Sinn', that which means a concept for us and 'Bedeutung', something to which the concept refers. His well-known example: "The Evening Star is the Morning Star". Both concepts refer to the same planet Venus.